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Secrecy Analysis of UAV-Based mmWave Relaying Networks
Xiaowei Pang, Mingqian Liu, Member, IEEE, Nan Zhao, Senior Member, IEEE, Yunfei Chen, Senior
Member, IEEE, Yonghui Li, Fellow, IEEE, and F. Richard Yu, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Employing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in
millimeter-wave (mmWave) networks as relays has emerged as
an appealing solution to assist remote or blocked communication
nodes. In this case, the network security becomes a great
challenge due to the presence of malicious eavesdroppers. In this
paper, we perform a secrecy analysis for a UAV-based mmWave
relaying network. We first investigate the relaying scheme without
jamming where the UAV decodes and forwards the information
from the source to the destination with malicious eavesdropping.
Furthermore, to enhance the secrecy performance, we propose
a cooperative jamming scheme via utilizing the destination and
an external UAV to cooperatively disrupt the eavesdroppers at
the two stages of relaying, respectively. Using the probability
of line-of-sight (LoS) between the UAV and ground nodes, the
three-dimensional (3D) antenna gain, and the Nakagami-m small-
scale fading model, the secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the
two schemes with and without jamming is analyzed. Closed-form
expressions for the SOP of the two schemes are obtained by
employing the Gauss-Chebyshev quadrature. Simulation results
are presented to validate the theoretical expressions of SOP and
to show the effectiveness of the proposed schemes.
Index Terms—Cooperative jamming, millimeter-wave, physical
layer security, relay, secrecy outage probability, unmanned aerial
vehicle
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been deployed at an
astounding pace in wireless communication systems over the
past decade, thanks to their high mobility, on-demand deploy-
ment and enhanced line-of-sight (LoS) probability [1]. UAVs
have been extensively applied in multifarious scenarios for
different purposes, such as seamless coverage [2], relaying [3],
data gathering [4], and internet of things (IoT) applications [5].
On the standpoint of service provision, UAVs can be employed
as an aerial platform to enhance the communication quality of
existing terrestrial wireless systems [6]. Furthermore, UAVs
can also be integrated into cellular networks as aerial users to
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ensure ultra-reliable wireless links, as cellular-connected UAV
communication [7], [8].
As other communication devices, UAVs have to deal with
the growing data rate as well as the overcrowding spectrum. In
this regard, millimeter-wave (mmWave) communication offers
much wider bandwidth and is a promising technique to be
utilized in UAV networks to enable much higher capacity [9].
The short wavelength of mmWave allows massive antennas
to be packed on a small UAV so that beamforming can be
carefully designed to overcome the drawbacks of mmWave
such as severe path loss and blocking. Moreover, UAVs can
flexibly change their locations to avoid blockages and thus are
suitable for the mmWave transmission [10]. For example, a
novel channel tracking method based on the flight control was
proposed by Zhao et al. in [11], where the three-dimensional
(3D) geometry channel model was formulated as a function of
the UAV movement and the channel gain. A novel hardware-
efficient implementation for mmWave hybrid precoding was
proposed in [12], and hybrid precoding can also be employed
in mmWave UAV networks. Particularly, hybrid precoding was
jointly optimized with the UAV placement and power alloca-
tion in [13] to maximize the energy efficiency of mmWave
UAV networks.
An increasingly interesting application of UAVs is relaying
network, where UAVs act as relays to assist the transmission
between two terrestrial terminals without reliable direct links
due to obstacles or a long distance [14]. One of the challenges
for practical applications is to find the optimal location for a
static relay or the trajectory for a mobile relay. Particularly,
the optimum altitude of the UAV as a relaying station for
maximum reliability was investigated by Chen et al. in [15],
with both static and mobile UAVs considered. Moreover,
Chen et al. designed an algorithm to find the optimal UAV
position to establish the best wireless relay link in [16]. To
effectively minimize the decoding error probability subject to
the latency requirement for UAV-enabled relaying systems,
the UAV location and blocklength were jointly optimized in
[17]. and the UAV location and power allocation were jointly
optimized in [18], respectively. To achieve the full potential
of UAVs, the mobility of UAV was utilized by Zhang et al.
in [19], where the trajectory and transmit power are jointly
optimized to minimize the outage probability of the relay
network. Furthermore, Kong et al. in [20] proposed a novel
UAV-relaying method for mmWave communications, where
the UAV gradually adjusts its path to approach the optimal
location in an accurate and efficient way. In [21], Zhu et al.
jointly optimized the UAV position, analog beamforming, and
power control to maximize the achievable rate in a full-duplex
UAV relaying network. However, none of them has considered
the security aspect of UAV relaying networks.
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Despite the advantages of UAV-enabled relaying networks,
the broadcast nature and the LoS of UAVs channels pose
great threats to the network security. Thus, it is important
to study physical layer security problem to provide secure
transmission by leveraging the imperfections of the commu-
nication medium [22]. Aiming at maximizing the secrecy
rate, Wang et al. proposed a mobile relaying scheme in a
four-node senario including a source, a destination, a UAV
relay, and an eavesdropper [23]. In [24], a joint precoding
scheme was proposed for UAV-aided networks to achieve
simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIP-
T) while guaranteeing the secure transmission for passive
receivers. In [25], the secrecy performance of a mmWave
SWIPT UAV-based relaying system was analyzed, with both
amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF) pro-
tocols considered. Particularly, cooperative jamming has been
regarded as an effective enabler for secure communication
by imposing interference to eavesdroppers [26]. The resource
allocation and trajectory design were investigated by Li et
al. in [27] for secure UAV-enabled systems, where UAVs
can provide communications or serve as jammers. To ensure
energy-efficient secure UAV communication, the trajectory and
resource allocation were jointly optimized by Cai et al. in [28]
with the assistance of a multi-antenna jamming UAV. In [29],
Chen et al. proposed a new joint relay and jammer selection
scheme and maximized the secrecy rate via power allocation.
Employing UAVs as jammmers, the secrecy performance of
UAV-enabled mmWave networks was analyzed in [30] by Zhu
et al., with the practical constraints of UAV deployment and
unique propagation characteristics. However, none of them
has considered jointly employing the UAV and ground nodes
as jammers to disturb eavesdropping in mmWave UAV-based
relaying systems.
Motivated by these observations, we consider a UAV-based
mmWave relaying network in this paper, where a UAV is
employed to assist the communication between the ground
source and destination. We propose two UAV relaying schemes
with and without jamming, and analyze the secrecy perfor-
mance by deriving the secrecy outage probability (SOP). To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that utilizes
the destination and the UAV to cooperatively transmit jamming
signals in UAV-based mmWave relaying networks. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• A UAV-based mmWave relaying network is studied to
help forward confidential information from the ground
source to the destination in the presence of multiple
eavesdroppers that are assumed to be deployed according
to a homogeneous Poisson point process (HPPP) distri-
bution. We consider both the probabilities of LoS and
non-line-of-sight (NLoS) links when modeling mmWave
UAV-to-ground channels with Nakagami-m fading. In
addition, we employ the 3D antenna gain model to
characterize the mmWave directional transmission.
• We first investigate the secrecy performance of the
UAV-based mmWave relaying network without jamming,
where the transmission is divided into two time slots.
Specifically, the relaying UAV and eavesdroppers receive
the confidential information from the source in the first
time slot. In the second slot, the UAV forwards the mes-
sages to the destination in the presence of eavesdropping.
For a given secrecy rate threshold, the theoretical SOP of
the scheme is derived to evaluate the secrecy performance
by employing the Gauss-Chebyshev quadrature.
• To further guarantee the secure transmission, we develop
a cooperative jamming scheme exploiting the destination
and a jamming UAV to disturb the eavesdropping in the
two time slots, respectively. In contrast to the existing s-
tudies on UAV-based relaying networks without jamming
or only using UAVs as jammers, we not only employ a
jamming UAV but also exploit the destination to send
jamming signals at its spare time to promote the secure
performance. The theoretical SOP of the scheme with
cooperative jamming is derived by adopting a two-layer
Gauss-Chebyshev quadrature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, the system model is introduced. The secrecy perfor-
mance of the UAV-based mmWave relaying networks without
and with cooperative jamming is investigated in Section III and
Section IV, respectively. In Section V, numerical results are
provided to validate the derived SOP performance, followed
by the conclusions in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a UAV-based mmWave relaying network as illus-
trated in Fig. 1, where a UAV (U ) is employed as a relay to
assist the transmission from the source (S) to the destination
(D). Note that there is no direct link between S and D due
to the severe path loss or blockage. Assume that the relaying
UAV works in half-duplex using the DF strategy. The total
transmission is divided into two time slots. In the first time
slot, S transmits signals to U in the first time slot, and in the
second time slot, U forwards the signals to D. Meanwhile,
multiple eavesdroppers on the ground intend to wiretap the
confidential information in both two slots. The distribution of
eavesdroppers is modeled as an HPPP ΦE with density λE ,
and we use E to denote the eavesdroppers with E ∈ ΦE .
Considering the small size of mmWave antennas, all the nodes
are assumed to be equipped with multiple antennas.
Two transmission schemes without and with cooperative
jamming are investigated in this paper. The scheme without
jamming includes the legitimate transmission from S to U
and from U to D with malicious eavesdropping, and its
transmission process can be referred to Fig. 1 by removing
the jamming links. For the scheme with cooperative jamming,
D is utilized to interfere the eavesdropping in the first time
slot by sending jamming signals1 as shown in Fig. 1(a). In the
second time slot, an external UAV is employed as a jammer to
combat the eavesdropping as shown in Fig. 1(b). The relaying
UAV and jamming UAV are assumed to be deployed at the
same altitude H , while the vertical heights of terrestrial nodes
S, D, and E are negligible compared with H .
1It is assumed that the antennas equipped at D can be used for either
transmitting or receiving signals at a specific time slot.
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(a) First Time Slot
(b) Second Time Slot
Fig. 1. Illustration of the mmWave UAV-based relaying scheme with coop-
erative jamming. (a) Transmissions in the first time slot. (b) Transmissions in
the second time slot.
A. Channel Model
It is known that the air-to-ground channels can be LoS or
NLOS links due to the blockage effect [31]. According to [32],
the occurrence probability of LoS links is given as
PL(r) =
1
1 +A exp(−B(arctan(Hr )−A))
, (1)
where r denotes the horizontal distance between the UAV
and a ground node. A and B are constants relying on the
environment. Accordingly, the probability of NLoS links is
calculated as PN (r) = 1− PL(r).
With the 3D distance of a LoS or NLoS link denoted by d,




−αL , LoS links,
βNd
−αN , NLoS links, (2)
where αL and αN denote the path loss exponents for LoS
and NLoS links, respectively. βL and βN can be considered
as intercepts of the LOS and NLOS path loss formulas,
respectively.
In the following sections, we use dij and rij to denote the
3D distance and the horizontal distance between nodes i and
j, respectively, where i, j ∈ {S,D,E,U, J}. Without loss of
generality, we assume that each link experiences independent
Nakagami−m fading. Particularly, the small-scale fading pow-
er between the ith and jth nodes is denoted as hij , which is
a Gamma random variable. We have hij ∼ Γ(NL, 1/NL) for
a LoS link and hij ∼ Γ(NN , 1/NN ) for a NLoS link, where
NL and NN are integers and denote the Nakagami fading
parameters for LoS links and NLoS links, respectively.
B. 3D Antenna Gain
Assume that the relaying UAV (U ) and jamming UAV (J)
are equipped with NU and NJ antennas, respectively. For a
ground node g ∈ {S,D,E}, the number of antennas is denoted
as Ng. Similar to [25], we adopt a 3D sectorized antenna mod-
el taking into account the directional mmWave transmission
and the UAV’s altitude. For each node j ∈ {S,D,E,U, J},
the main-lobe gain and side-lobe gain are expressed as GjM
with probability pjM and G
j
m with probability p
j
m, respectively.
Thus, the directional antenna gain and the corresponding


































, g ∈ {S,D,E}, (4)
where ψa (ψg) and θa (θg) denote the half-power beamwidth
in the azimuth and the elevation, respectively. Particularly, we
consider the worst case for the elevation angle at ground nodes
similar to [30], and accordingly the elevation angle of ground
nodes is uniformly distributed in the range of [θg/2, π−θg/2].
Assume perfect beam alignment for the legitimate links
between S (D) and U , and the misalignment caused by
UAV jittering is supposed to be well mitigated by existing
techniques [33]. Thus, the antenna gains from S to U and from
U to D can be given by GSU = GSMG
U





respectively. In contrast, the antenna gain of an eavesdropping
































, a ∈ {U, J}. (5)
III. SECRECY ANALYSIS WITHOUT JAMMING
In this section, we analyze the secrecy performance of a
UAV-based relaying network without jamming. Using DF, the











where PS (PU ) is the transmit power of S (U ), and σ2U
(σ2D) denotes the power of the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) at U (D).
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In addition, we suppose that the eavesdroppers are inde-
pendent and use the selection combining scheme to decode
the received signals from the source and the UAV. Thus, the











where the SNR at each eavesdropper for decoding signals from









and σ2E is the noise power at eavesdroppers.




[log2(1 + γD)− log2(1 + γE)]
+
, (10)
where [x]+ , max(x, 0). We set the threshold of secrecy rate
at the desired receiver D as Rth, and thus, the secrecy outage
occurs when the secrecy rate is lower than Rth. Specifically,
the secrecy outage probability of D can be derived as





























(1 + y)2−2Rth − 1
)
fγD(y)dy, (11)
where FγE (·) is the cumulative probability function (CDF) of
γE and fγD (·) is the probability distribution function (PDF)
of γD.
To derive the secrecy outage probability, the distributions
of the SNR at D as well as the highest eavesdropping SNR
at all the eavesdroppers are derived in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: The CDF and PDF of γD can be given as (12a)
and (12b) respectively at the top of the next page.
Proof: For the Gamma random variable hij ∼



































































































Step (a) is derived using the complementary cumulative dis-
tribution function (CCDF) of hij by 1 − Fh(x). Taking the
derivative of FγD(γ), we can easily obtain the PDF of γD as
(12b).
The CDF of γE can be expressed as



























Based on this, We will calculate FγE (γ) in Theorem 2 by
deriving F1(γ) and F2(γ) separately.
Theorem 2: The CDF of γE can be given as (17) at the top
of the next page, where xj = cos( 2j−12J π), vj =
RU
2 (xj + 1),
and J denotes the number of nodes in the Chebyshev-Gauss
approximation. In addition, RU is the maximum connection
distance in the horizontal plane between U and a specific
eavesdropper, and r0 (R0) denotes the minimum (maximum)
connection distance between S and E.
Proof: First, define F1(γ) = E
[∏
E∈ΦE Pr{γSE < γ}
]
.

































































































































































































































































































where step (b) is based on (14) and step (c) is obtained
according to Eq. (3.381.9) in [35], . Substituting (19) into
(18), we can derive F1(γ). As the beam transmitted from





i , i ∈ {M,m}.
For convenience, let F2(γ) = E
[∏
E∈ΦE Pr{γUE < γ}
]
.
Using thinning theorem in the point process, the eavesdroppers
can be divided into a LoS PPP ΦLE with density λEPL(r) and a
NLoS PPP ΦNE with density λEPN (r), respectively. Therefore,










































































































Step (d) is computed by using Gauss-Chebyshev integration
[36], with xc = cos( 2c−12C π) and vc =
RU
2 (xc+1). C denotes
the number of the cumulative times.






















































By substituting (21), (22) and (23) into (20), we can obtain
F2(γ). Finally, FγE (γ) can be given as (17) by multiplying
F1(γ) with F2(γ).
Using (12b) and (17), Psop can be calculated according
to (11). However, the integral does not have a closed-form
expression due to the complicated expressions in (12b) and
(17). Hence, Gauss-Chebyshev quadrature is exploited to
achieve a close approximation. Particularly, it should satisfy
(1+y)2−2Rth −1 > 0 in (11), and accordingly the lower limit
of the integral is changed into y0 = 22Rth − 1. By means of














































































































Gauss-Chebyshev nodes. Thus, for any given Rth, we can
calculate Psop in the UAV-based mmWave relaying network
by substituting (12b) and (17) into (24).
Remark 1: According to (12b), (17) and (24), the SOP will
increase with Rth and is determined by the UAV altitude
H , the transmit power PS and PU , and the density λE .
We can easily find that the SOP monotonically increases
with λE . It is known that the communication quality of
LoS links outperforms that of NLoS links under the same
transmission distance. As the altitude of UAV increases, the
LoS probabilities PL(rSU ) and PL(rUD) increase, while the
communication distances dSU and dUD will also increase.
This indicates that the altitude of UAV should be moderately
designed to reach a lower path loss of legitimate transmission.
The approximation error of the Gauss-Chebyshev quadrature
can be reduced by increasing the number of nodes.
IV. SECRECY ANALYSIS WITH COOPERATIVE JAMMING
In this section, we consider the secrecy performance of
the UAV-based relaying network with cooperative jamming.
During the first time slot, S sends signals to U and D transmits
jamming signals at the same time to degrade the eavesdropping
channels as shown in Fig. 1(a). In the second time slot, the
jamming UAV J as a friendly jammer transmits jamming sig-
nals to enhance the secrecy performance as shown in Fig. 1(b).
To alleviate the jamming at U in the first time slot, we assume
that D adjusts the beamforming randomly but only transmits
jamming signals in horizontal directions. Similarly, J adjusts
the antenna steering orientation to misalign D with the partial
channel state information of D in the second time slot. There-
fore, we consider the antenna gains of jamming signals from D
to U and from J to D as GDU = GDmG
U





respectively. In addition, GDE = GDi G
E
j , i, j ∈ {M,m}
denotes the antenna gain between D and E with probability
p̃Di p
E




j , i, j ∈ {M,m} with probability
pJi p
E
j is the antenna gain between J and E. Specifically, p
J
i









and p̃Dm = 1−
ψD
2π .
With the jamming signal as the interference, the signal-to-

















The highest eavesdropping SINR among all the eavesdrop-



















Similar to (11), when the threshold of secrecy rate is set
as Rth, the SOP of the UAV-based relaying network utilizing
cooperative jamming can be derived as


















(1 + y)2−2Rth − 1
)
fJγD (y)dy, (31)




γD (·) is the PDF of γ
J
D
in the cooperative jamming scheme. Thus, we need to find the
distributions of the SINR at D as well as at the eavesdropper
with the highest eavesdropping SINR in the following.






















where L1(γ) and L2(γ) are given in (33a) and (33b) at the
top of this page.
Proof: Let Y1 = PSGSUL(dSU)hSU and Y2 =




























According to (13) and (14), the CDF FY1(y1) and the PDF





















PDGDUL(dDU ) . (35b)
Using (35a) and (35b), L1(γ) is derived as (36) at the top of
this page, and step (e) exploits Eq. (3.351-3) in [35]. Similarly,
we can obtain the expression of L2(γ) as presented in (33b).









where the derivatives of L1 and L2 are calculated as (38a)
and (38b) at the top of the next page, respectively. As a result,
the PDF of γD with cooperative jamming can be obtained by
substituting (33a), (33b), (38a) and (38b) into (37).
In the following, we will derive the CDF of the highest
eavesdropping SINR among all the eavesdroppers to calculate
P Jsop. To this end, the theoretical expressions of Pr{γJSE > γ}
and Pr{γJUE > γ} are derived in the following theorem.
Theorem 4: For convenience, we define the function-
s FE,1(r, θ) and FE,2(r, θ) that are related to a distance
variable and an angle variable to represent Pr{γJSE > γ}
and Pr{γJUE > γ}, respectively. The expressions are given
by (39a) and (39b) on the next page. Particularly, in (39b),
rJE =
√
r2 + r2UJ − 2rrUJ cos θ denotes the horizonal dis-
tance between J and E.
Proof: Comparing the expressions in (26) and (29), we
can observe that γJSE has a similar form with γ
J
SU . Similar to
the proof of Theorem 3, Pr{γJSE > γ} can be derived based












































































Since the distribution of eavesdroppers follows the PPP, rSE
and rDE are variables depending on the location of E. Define
r = rSE , with r0 ≤ r ≤ R0 and θ ∈ [0, 2π] that are random
variables denoting the distance from S to E and the angle
between connecting lines SE and SD, respectively. Therefore,
we have rDE =
√
r2 + r2SD − 2rrSD cos θ based on the law
of cosines. Furthermore, Pr{γJSE > γ} is replaced with the
function FE,1(r, θ) related to the two variables, i.e., r and θ.
In this case, the expression of FE,1(r, θ) can be obtained as
(39a) by applying corresponding variable substitutions to (40).
Let FE,2(r, θ) = Pr{γJUE > γ}, where r = rUE represents
the horizontal distance between U and E, and θ denotes
the angle between connecting lines UE and UJ . After that,
the horizontal distance from D to E can be calculated as
rDE =
√
r2 + r2UJ − 2rrUJ cos θ, where r2UJ is the hori-
zontal distance between J and U . With the UAV altitude
H considered, the lengths of the two links between U and






2, respectively. Through the similar proce-
dure of obtaining FE,1(r, θ), we can derive FE,2(r, θ) taking
into consideration that the links from U (J) to eavesdroppers
can be LoS or NLoS as





























































E (Nv − 1 + k)! , (39b). (41)
Similarly, the equality in (41) holds by applying corresponding
variable substitutions.
Based on Theorem 4, we can obtain the CDF of the
highest eavesdropping SINR among all the eavesdroppers

















Particularly, by utilizing the probability generating function of
PPP and a two-layer Gauss-Chebyshev quadrature equation,
F JγE (γ) can be derived as









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Constant values in the Urban
Environment
a = 9.6, b = 0.28
Nakagami fading parameters NL = 3, NN = 2
Path loss parameters αL = 2, βL = 10−6.4,
αN = 2.92, βN = 10−7.2
Transmission bandwidth BW = 1 GHz
Noise figure NF = 10 dB
Noise power −174 + 10 lg(BW ) + NF
dBm
The density of eavesdroppers λE = 10−4/m2
Minimum/maximum connection
distance from S to E
r0 = 20 m, R0 = 500 m
The number of Gauss-
Chebyshev nodes
C = L = T = 100
Number of antennas N = 16




Main-lobe gain GjM = N

























where xl = cos( 2l−12L π) and yt = cos(
2t−1
2T π) are Gauss-
Chebyshev nodes corresponding to θ and r, respectively.
Similarly, we can obtain FJ2 (γ) as
























As a result, F JγE (γ) can be calculated by substituting (43) and
(44) into (42).
Similar to (24), the analytical expression for SOP in the
UAV-based relaying network with cooperative jamming can
be given as






















where y0 = 22Rth − 1 and uc = cos( 2c−12C π). Finally, with
fJγD (γ) and F
J
γE (γ) derived above, we can calculate the SOP
by substituting them into (45).
Remark 2: A lot of system parameters can affect the secrecy
performance. The impacts of H and λE are similar to what is
in Remark 1. Also, the jamming transmit power is important.
It is not necessarily true that the larger the jamming power
is, the lower the SOP will be. This is because the jamming
signals not only degrade the eavesdropping channels but also
interfere with the legitimate transmission. Note that the SOP
expression in (45) specializes to the one without jamming by
setting PJ = PD = 0.








































Fig. 2. The secrecy outage probability without jamming, with PS = PU =
P .
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=1.5 bit/s/Hz, without jamming
R
th
=1.5 bit/s/Hz, with jamming
R
th
=1.4 bit/s/Hz, without jamming
R
th
=1.4 bit/s/Hz, with jamming
R
th
=1.3 bit/s/Hz, without jamming
R
th
=1.3 bit/s/Hz, with jamming
Simulation
Fig. 3. The secrecy outage probability versus the transmit power P , with
H = 200 m, N = 32 and λE = 5× 10−3/m2.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, numerical results are presented to demon-
strate the secrecy performance of the UAV-based mmWave
relaying network. Unless otherwise stated, the simulation
parameters are listed in Table I. Without loss of generality,
we set Nj = N, j ∈ {S,D,E,U, J} and the main-lobe
beamwidth, main-lobe and side-lobe gains are shown in Table
I. In addition, Monte Carlo simulations are conducted to
validate the theoretical results.
Without loss of generality, we consider a Cartesian coor-
dinate, where S is placed at the origin with the coordinate
WS = [0, 0], the coordinate of D is assumed as WD =
[400, 0], and the location of U projected on the ground is
WU = [200, 0]. First, we evaluate the secrecy performance of
the network without jamming for different system parameters
in Fig. 2. It can be observed that the theoretical results match
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well with the Monte-Carlo simulation. The results show that
the SOP increases with the rate threshold Rth, as expected.
In addition, better secrecy outage probability can be obtained
for H = 150 m than H = 200 m, but there is only
a narrow gap between the two curves. When the density
of eavesdroppers λE decreases from 10−3/m2 to 10−4/m2,
a significant improvement of secrecy performance can be
achieved. Comparing the two curves of different transmit
power P , we can see a wide gap between them, which implies
that the SOP can be dramatically decreased by increasing the
transmit power. As analyzed in Remark 1, the results in Fig.
2 demonstrate that the system parameters, such as the UAV
altitude, the density of eavesdroppers and the transmit power,
can affect the secrecy performance.
In Fig. 3, we plot the SOP versus the transmit power P
with the two proposed schemes, where PS = PU = P and
PD = PJ = P/2. For the cooperative jamming scheme, the
location of the jamming UAV is set as WJ = [200, 50]. In both
schemes, one can see that the SOP decreases as P increases
and finally approaches a lower limit. This is because the gap
of qualities between the wiretapping channels and legitimate
channels expands as the transmit power increases. However,
when P is large enough, the gap of their channel capacities
becomes constant. The effect of cooperative jamming on the
secrecy outage probability is illustrated by comparing the
curves with and without jamming. More specifically, the gap
of SOP between the two schemes enlarges when P increases,
which indicates that the performance improvement of SOP
by employing cooperative jamming is more significant when
higher transmit power is available. Therefore, we should
employ cooperative jamming and properly improve the trans-
mit power to effectively enhance the secrecy performance in
practice. In the following, we will focus on evaluating the
secrecy performance of the UAV-based relaying network with
cooperative jamming.
In Fig. 4, we investigate the effect of λE on the SOP
with cooperative jamming when adopting different number of
antennas and rate thresholds. We set PS = PU = 0.1 W,
PD = PJ = 0.05 W and H = 200 m. The SOP increases
with the increase of λE , due to the fact that there are more
potential eavesdroppers around S and D trying to wiretap
the confidential information and the channel quality with the
highest eavesdropping SINR will be better. In the case of
N = 16, the SOP is equal to 1 when Rth = 2 bit/s/Hz and
is very close to 1 when Rth = 1.5 bit/s/Hz. The SOP can be
significantly reduced by increasing the number of antennas.
This is because equipping more antennas can enhance the
main-lobe gain and meanwhile suppressing the side-lobe gain
with narrower half-power beamwidth, which encourages the
utilization of massive antennas in practical system designs.
Adopting the same power parameters as Fig. 4, Fig. 5 plots
the SOP versus the height of UAVs H for the cooperative
jamming scheme, with a step size of 50 m. It is seen that the
SOP first decreases as H becomes higher and then increases
with H . As a result, there exists an optimal value of H
which achieves the optimal SOP. This is due to the tradeoff
between the path-loss distance and the LoS probability when
H varies. Also, the legitimate channel benefits more than the
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Fig. 4. The secrecy outage probability versus the eavesdropper density λE ,
with PS = PU = 0.1 W, PD = PJ = 0.05 W and H = 200 m.










































Fig. 5. The secrecy outage probability versus the height of the UAVs with
cooperative jamming. PS = PU = 0.1 W and PD = PJ = 0.05 W.
eavesdropping channel with the highest SINR in the low H
regime, while the opposite is the case with higher H . We can
also see that for the case λE = 10−4, N = 32, the SOP first
decreases much more dramatically but then grows at a very
slow pace when H increases. This is because the quality of
channels in this case is much more sensitive to H than that
of the other two cases with higher density of eavesdroppers
and smaller number of antennas. The results in Fig. 5 motivate
us to find an optimal height of UAV to achieve the optimal
secrecy performance for practical systems in the future.
To gain more insights, we investigate the impact of the
power of jamming signals on the SOP in Figs. 6-9. Particularly,
we set WJ = [200, 50], PS = PU = 1 W, λE = 10−4 and
H = 100 m in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. By setting PD = 0 W, we
plot the SOP versus the transmit power of J in Fig. 6. As we
can see, the SOP decreases almost linearly with PJ due to the
fact that the jamming signals received at D is much weaker
11








































Fig. 6. The secrecy outage probability versus the transmit power of J with
cooperative jamming. PD = 0 W.






































Fig. 7. The secrecy outage probability versus the jamming power of D with
cooperative jamming. PJ = 1 W.
than eavesdroppers. This can be explained by the fact that the
beam direction of J is set not to align D. In this context, it
is reasonable for us to choose PJ = 1 W when the transmit
power of J is limited by the maximum value 1 W. Setting
PJ = 1 W, Fig. 7 depicts the SOP versus the jamming power
of D, PD. By comparison, the SOP increases with PD. This
is because in this condition, the performance loss of U caused
by the jamming from D is larger than that of the eavesdropper
with the highest eavesdropping SINR. Thus, we can conclude
that it is better to adopt PJ = 1 W and PD = 0 W to achieve
high secrecy performance in the considered cases.
Furthermore, we change some of the parameters as WJ =
[150, 0], WD = [450, 0], λE = 5 × 10−3 and H = 500 m,
and analyze the SOP affected by the jamming power. In Fig.
8, one can see that the SOP is not monotonic with PD and
there is an optimal jamming power of D to minimize the SOP.
The reason for this is that the rate performance of U is more







































Fig. 8. The secrecy outage probability versus the jamming power of D with
cooperative jamming. PJ = 0 W.








































Fig. 9. The secrecy outage probability versus the transmit power of J with
cooperative jamming. PD = 0.6 W.
sensitive to the jamming power of D as the channel between D
and U is dominated by LoS in this case. When PD is small, the
receiving jamming power at U may be much weaker compared
with its legitimate receiving signals while the jamming signals
can degrade the SINR at eavesdroppers. However, as PD gets
large enough, the rate loss of U results from the jamming
signals will be more severe than that of eavesdroppers. With
PD = 0.6 W, Fig. 9 shows the similar performance as in Fig.
6, and thus, we will not go into details here. As a result, under
this case, it is preferable to set PJ = 1 W and PD = 0.6 W
to lower the SOP. The results shown in Figs. 6-9 reveal that
there are the optimal values of PJ and PD to achieve the
optimal secrecy performance. Thus, we should jointly design
the jamming power in the two time slots according to the
practical system topologies and parameters.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have studied the secure transmission
in UAV-based mmWave relaying networks, where Nakagami
fading for LoS and NLoS links, and 3D directional transmis-
sions are considered. Specifically, two transmission schemes
have been proposed. The SOP of the proposed schemes have
been analyzed. In both schemes, the CDF of the highest
eavesdropping SINR among all the eavesdroppers and the PDF
of the SINR at the destination have been derived to calculate
the SOP. Simulation results have shown the effectiveness of
the proposed schemes in guaranteeing the security of UAV-
based mmWave relaying networks. In the future work, we
will further improve the secrecy performance of UAV-based
relaying networks via the mobility of UAVs.
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